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Abstract 
This paper investigates examine the effects of ownership and control on mutual savings banks with respect to 
management performance and soundness in Korea. This study further verifies what factors determine the 
sustainability of mutual savings banks and and also examines how management structure affects their 
performance. First, for performance, corporate-owned mutual savings banks managed by professional CEOs seem to have 
a negative relationship with performance. Second, for firm sustainability as an independent variable, the difference in 
ownership structure does not affect the sustainability of savings banks when ownership is divided into corporate and private. 
Finally, according to the results of the logit model on whether the independent variables affect the management form and 
ownership structure, the largest shareholder’s participation in management was not affected by almost all variables, except 
for bank size. Moreover, ownership type had a positive effect on the management participation of the largest shareholder 
because most of the insolvent mutual savings banks were taken over by banks and other corporations when they became 
bankrupt. 
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Management Performance, Sustainability, Management Form, Mutual Savings 
Banks 
1. Introduction 
Since Berle and Means (1932) identified the separation between ownership and management in modern corporate 
finance, numerous studies have been conducted on the relationship between corporate performance and governance. 
Subsequently, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued the manager who runs a company on behalf of shareholders should act 
faithfully to their interests, but may seek his/her own interest due to the agency problem. However, this can be minimized by 
designing an incentive-compatible structure or monitoring the manager. Mutual savings banks, classified as leading 
consumer-based financial institutions in Korea, have a relatively high proportion of shares held by large shareholders 
amongst financial institutions.  
From a management viewpoint, they are financial institutions for which direct management is generalized. That is, the 
owner, rather than a professional CEO, is directly involved in management or engages someone related to the owner as 
manager. Several scholars pointed out the concentration of ownership and management as a direct cause for the insolvency 
of mutual savings banks from 2011 to 2014. They experienced a management crisis starting from 2011 due to the 2008 
global financial crisis and the insolvency of project financing caused by the real estate market recession. Moreover, around 
30 mutual savings banks had been forced out of the market by 2014 due to the restructuring process. The primary reason for 
their insolvency was due to loan insolvency. However, the more fundamental reason is the relatively large share ownership 
by individuals and their active participation in management, which has led to poor monitoring by shareholders. Additionally, 
as most mutual savings banks are unlisted, market monitoring has not operated properly. In other words, mutual savings 
banks do not have decentralized share ownership, unlike banks.  
Numerous cases of owner management have been observed, where mutual savings banks are managed under the absolute 
control of the owner and fail to be properly monitored, ultimately leading to insolvency. While this process has advantages, 
such as quick decision-making and solving the agency problem, if the owner’s pursuit of private interests is not properly 
monitored and controlled, the financial institution may become insolvent, resulting in significant social losses.  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the effects of ownership and control on mutual savings banks with 
respect to management performance and soundness. Additionally, since mutual savings banks have undergone restructuring 
several times, this study further verifies what factors determine the viability or sustainability of mutual savings banks and 
also examines how management structure affects their performance and how their management performance differs from 
those of financial institutions managed by professional CEOs. First, section 2 examines the characteristics of mutual savings 
banks’ ownership and governance structure. It then identifies prior studies on the issues that may arise when corporate 
ownership is concentrated or when ownership and management are not separated based on the agency problem. Second, 
section 3 describes the model and variables used to examine the ownership and management structure and the management 
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Holding ratio 
performance of mutual savings banks and we explain the results of the analysis using an econometric model. Finally, section 
4 summarizes the paper and discusses future research projects. 
 
2. Ownership Governance Structure and Characteristics of Mutual Savings Banks 
 
2.1 Ownership Governance Structure of Mutual Savings Banks 
Unlike other financial institutions in Korea, such as banks, the individuals hold a large share of the stock ownership of 
mutual savings banks because mutual savings banks started with the intention of absorbing private loan system. Therefore, 
there were no restrictions on stock ownership for private moneylenders. As of December 2007, among the total 108 mutual 
savings banks, 43 had corporations as a major shareholder, accounting for only 39.9% of the total. The number of mutual 
savings banks with corporations as largest shareholder has increased sharply, accounting for 40 (57.0%) out of the 93 mutual 
savings banks as of December 2012, which corresponds to the restructuring period, and 46 (58.2%) out of 79 banks as of 
December 2016 when restructuring had been completed. The sharp increase of corporate shareholders as largest 
shareholders in mutual savings banks is attributed to the government, which had orchestrated most insolvent mutual savings 
banks to be taken over by banks, other financial institutions, and corporations through restructuring, as private mutual 
savings banks were creating moral hazard due to owner management.  
On the other hand, the number of mutual savings banks with above 50% of shares held by the largest shareholder 
increased from 47.2% in 2007 to 65.9% in 2016. As a result of restructuring, the ratio of corporate ownership increased for 
mutual savings banks. At the same time, the concentration of ownership by the largest shareholder also increased 
significantly.  
 
Table 1.  Change of the large shareholders’ proportion of mutual savings banks 
  2007.12 2012.12 2016.12 
Individ
ual 
Firm Sum 
Individ
ual 
Firm Sum 
Individ
ual 
Firm Sum 
above 80% 8 18 
26 
(24.1) 
6 33 
39 
(42.0) 
4 27 
31 
(39.2) 
50~80% 15 10 
25 
(23.1) 
11 11 
22 
(23.6) 
11 10 
21 
(26.7) 
below 50% 42 15 
57 
(52.8) 
23 9 
32 
(34.4) 
18 9 
27 
(34.1) 
sum 
65 
(60.1) 
43 
(39.9) 
108 
(100) 
40 
(43.0) 
53 
(57.0) 
93 
(100) 
33 
(41.8) 
46 
(58.2) 
79 
(100) 
Note: According to the largest shareholder notation in the auditor’s report, (   ) is the proportion of the total 
Source: Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
 
Subsequently, the management control of the largest shareholder of mutual savings banks is examined by classifying as 
“direct management” when the largest shareholder directly participates in management as the CEO, “indirect management” 
when the largest shareholder indirectly participates in management by also acting as an executive, and “professional 
management” when a third person, independent of the largest shareholder, participates in management as CEO. At the end 
of 2013, direct management, accounted for 47.2% of the total 89 mutual savings banks, which shows the number of mutual 
savings banks directly managed by the largest shareholder decreased significantly compared to the 61 (58.1%) at the end of 
2010. The number of indirect management mutual savings banks in which the largest shareholder also acts as an executive, 
although few, decreased to six at the end of 2013 from the 13 at the end of 2010. On the other hand, mutual savings banks 
managed by professional CEOs, increased sharply from 37.2% in 2010, before restructuring, to 58.4% in 2013. As a result 
of the restructuring, the mutual savings banks where the largest shareholders were directly or indirectly involved in 
management were driven out of the market more than those run by professional management. In effect, most of the 
insolvent mutual savings banks were taken over by corporations and managed by professional CEOs. As a result, while 
savings bank management experienced restructuring and a deteriorating management environment, direct management by 
the owner was generalized for privately owned mutual savings banks and professional management by professional CEOs 
for corporate-owned large mutual savings banks. 
 
Type 
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Table 2. Types of management of the Large Shareholder’s Form (unit: number, %) 
? ???????? ???????? ????????
??????????????? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ???? ???????????
??????????
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???????
?????????
??
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??? ?? ?? ?????????? ?? ??
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??????
?????????????
?????????
??
??? ??? ??? ?????????? ?? ???
???
???????
???? ???? ??????????
???
???????
????
??????
???
???????
???
???????
???
??????
Source: Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
 
2.2 Prior Studies 
Unlike banks, mutual savings banks do not have strict restrictions on industrial capital and individual stock ownership 
(Note1). Therefore, most of them have controlling shareholders whose dominance is strong. The financial supervisory 
authority is aware of the harmful effects of controlling shareholders and attempts to prevent moral hazard through various 
legal provisions. However, as majority shareholders continue to perform illegal acts despite legal provisions, the financial 
supervisory authority minimized the mismanagement possibility by majority shareholders by strengthening the control 
function against them and removing unqualified majority shareholders. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued the concentration 
of stock ownership reduces agency cost and creates an incentive to maximize corporate value.  
Additionally, Leland and Pyle (1977) found stock ownership by the management in the presence of information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders can be perceived as a positive signal that management is confident about 
company future performance. They also explained that such managerial behavior operates in the direction of lowering 
agency cost. On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) proved that the combination of ownership and management can 
damage the interests of outside stakeholders in that the founder can pursue private profit maximization by managing the 
company at the expense of interests others than those of the stakeholders. Subsequently, Anderson et al. (2003) found the 
combination of ownership and management in family firms is closely related to family reputation. Therefore, the incentive 
to improve corporate performance is stronger than that of firms where ownership and management are separate. Regarding 
the management performance of family firms where ownership and management are combined, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
compared their management performance to that of non-family firms from the US S&P 500 firms in the 1990s and found 
family firms exceeded the management performance of non-family ones. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Analysis Model and Variable Composition 
The ownership and governance structure of mutual savings banks not only affect the management performance of mutual 
savings banks but also overall management, including risk-seeking behaviors. That is, if a largest shareholder exists and 
participates directly or indirectly in management, there is a possibility the soundness of the savings bank may be greatly 
damaged due to its pursuit of private interest when the checks and balances system is insufficient. Therefore, management 
by a professional CEO can generally be positive in terms of securing expertise compared with the case where the majority 
shareholder participates in management directly or indirectly. The management condition of the savings bank can thus be 
improved. Consequently, this study first analyzes the effects of the ownership and governance structure of mutual savings 
banks on their management performance. For this purpose, panel data is analyzed using a linear probability model. 
The empirical model we use to estimate the relationship between ownership and performance is shown in equation (1). 
We also investigate whether firm sustainability enhances performance, as modeled by equation (2). We employ panel 
regression to estimate these equations. 
 
 
,                                                (1) 
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,                                                (2) 
where i and t represent particular mutual savings banks and time.  
Here, the  of the savings bank is the ROA of an individual savings bank and  is the period 
from the year of establishment to present.  is a company unique variable and  a macro variable that affects 
the overall management of mutual savings banks. 
The data are from the financial information system provided by the Financial Supervisory Service and individual business 
reports. The analysis periods are half-years from 2007 to 2016, which includes the restructuring period for mutual savings 
banks (Note 2). The number of mutual savings banks included in the analysis decreased from 107 in 2007 to 79 by 2016. An 
unbalanced panel model was used, with consideration for the annual change in the number of mutual savings banks due to 
restructuring. 
Next, an empirical analysis was conducted utilizing a binary logit model to examine which corporate characteristics 
influence ownership and governance structure, with a value of 1 when the bank is corporate-owned, and 0 otherwise. 
Management type were originally classified into direct, indirect, and professional. However, indirect management was 
included under the direct management category and designated as a binary variable (Note 3). 
 
P (ownershipit) = F (Firmit, Macroit) and P (managerit) = F (Firmit, Macroit).  
 
Here, F ( · ) for equation ( ) is a logistic cumulate distribution function. In general, for the logit model 
 
                                                                          (3) 
 
                                       .                                     (4) 
 
In the above equation, when the cumulative distribution function of the probability distribution is standard normal, it 
becomes a probit model. However, as we assume a logistic distribution, it becomes a logit model. Additionally, P 
(ownershipit) indicates the probability the largest shareholder is a corporation. The variables used in this linear probability 
model and logistic analysis are as follows: 
 
Independent variables 
Firm performance 
The average annual rate of profit after tax on total assets (ROA) was used to measure management performance. 
Firm sustainability 
The duration from establishment to 2018 was considered as firm sustainability and used to determine which variables 
influenced the survival of the firm. 
Ownership 
A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is a corporation and 0 if an individual was used.  
Manager 
A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholder directly manages the savings bank or participates as an 
executive and of 0 if the management is entrusted to a professional CEO was used.  
 
Dependent variables 
Stock ownership ratio of largest shareholder 
In addition to adopting the stock ownership ratio of the blockholder as a variable, a variable for each section is used, 
where the blockholder’s shares are divided into 50% or less, 50%–80%, and 80% or more. 
History 
As a general indicator of how long the savings bank existed, that is, the period from the foundation to the final year 
(2018) was adopted. 
ROA 
The average annual rate of profit after tax on total assets (ROA) was used as profitability index. 
BIS 
The BIS ratio is used as an index of the soundness of mutual savings banks. 
Non-performing loans 
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The ratio of substandard loans to total loans was used as an index of the soundness of the mutual savings banks’ assets. 
Expense ratio 
The expense ratio (selling and administrative expenses) was used to represents the expenses of the savings bank. 
Asset 
To examine how the ownership and governance structure differ depending on size, a variable that takes the national log of 
the asset was used. 
Land index 
To examine how the possibility of insolvency affects the ownership and governance structure, the commercial real estate 
rate of change compared the same quarter of the previous year, which is the main collateral of mutual savings banks, was 
used. Since the decrease in land prices affects the quality of mortgage loans over time, a time lag variable with half-year lag 
was considered. 
GDP 
Economic growth was used as a variable, as it positively affects the management of mutual savings banks and impacts the 
stability of the governance and ownership structure of mutual savings banks. 
 
Table 3. Definitions and descriptive statistics for variable 
Independent variable                            Definitions 
ROA 
sustainability 
ownership 
manager 
average annual rate of profit after tax on total assets 
firm sustainability 
ownership 1 or 0 
managed 1 or 0 
dependent variable  
BIS 
Asset 
NPL 
COA 
Portion 
por 80 
por 50 
BIS ratio 
Ln (total asset) 
nonperforming ratio (nonperforming loans/total loans) 
expense ratio (selling and administrative expenses/total asset) 
portion of large shareholder 
large shareholder holds above 80% share 
large shareholder holds above 80% share 
commercial(-1) 
GDP 
previous period land index for commercial area 
GDP growth rate 
 
Based on these variables, the Breusch-Pagan test was conducted to verify whether it is necessary to consider the fixed 
object properties of the error term in the linear panel model. As a result, the value of Kai 2 is 553.22 and the P-value is 0. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that the error term is 0 was rejected and the random effects model used instead of OLS. Next, 
the Hausman test was conducted to determine whether the fixed or random effects model was more suitable. As the value of 
Chi square was 0.1614, the null hypothesis that P = 0 was rejected and the random effects model used. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations between variables 
 own por sur bis lasset npl exp  commer1  
manage
r 
por80 por50 gdp 
own 1            
por 0.48 1           
sur -0.29 -0.3652 1          
bis 0.03 0.0593 0.0122 1         
lasset 0.36 0.1755 -0.192 -0.2169 1        
npl 0.1 0.0757 -0.0887 -0.2332 0.0013 1       
exp 0.06 0.1676 -0.1834 0.1213 -0.1549 0.0124 1      
commercial1 -0.01 -0.0115 0.0092 0.0093 -0.0273 -0.0453 0.0571   1     
manager1 0.54 0.4899 -0.303 0.0755 0.422 0.062 0.0959   -0.0099   1     
por80 0.42 0.8444 -0.3813 0.0703 0.1321 0.0674 0.2035   0.0024   0.4720 1   
por50 -0.07 -0.0089 0.1056 0.0333 -0.0167 -0.029 -0.0623  -0.0165  -0.0889 -0.4317 1  
gdp 0.01 0.002 0.0068 -0.0237 0.019 0.0003 0.0052   -0.6530  -0.0044 -0.0015 -0.0019 1 
 
3.2 Empirical Results 
First, the analysis was performed by setting performance as dependent variable. The stock ownership ratio of the largest shareholder 
was used as variable. Dummy variables, ranging from 0%–50%, 50%–80%, and 80% or more, were also used. First, the performance of a 
corporate-owned savings bank managed by a professional CEO was evaluated as effective at the 1% level. However, since the coefficient’s 
sign is negative, the management performance of a corporate-owned savings bank managed by a professional CEO is lower than that of a 
privately-owned savings bank. These results are consistent with the analysis of Anderson et al. (2003), which suggests mutual savings 
banks where individuals participate directly in management play a role in lowering agency cost, thus demonstrating higher management 
Variable Obs Mean       Std. Dev. Min Max 
own 1907 .5160    .4999 0.0000  1.0000  
por 1907 61.9733     29.2689 9.2000  100.0000  
sur 1907 36.3991   12.9763 5.0000  50.0000  
roa 1906 -.40053     4.7702 -65.1900  25.5300  
bis 1907 13.0036    21.0187 -187.2000  490.1500  
lasset 1907 12.7900    1.0460 8.2920  15.5594  
npl 1692 11.4289     13.0086 0.0000  275.8994  
exp 1907 1.2575     .8130 0.0058  11.8508  
commercial 1907 1.6121     2.3258 -4.5092  5.9589  
manager 1596 .4016    .4904 0.0000  1.0000  
por80 1907 .3361    .4725 0.0000  1.0000  
por50 1907 .2585     .4380 0.0000  1.0000  
gdp 1907 3.4213     2.2091 -1.6000  7.4000  
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efficiency. Additionally, as in the general financial theory, the increase of the BIS ratio and decrease of nonperforming loans were observed 
to increase ROA at the 1% significance level. Next, the rise in commercial real estate prices increases the performance of mutual savings 
banks at the 1% significance level. Further, the increase of the stock ownership ratio of the largest shareholder increases the profitability of 
mutual savings banks at the 10% significance level. As direct management of the largest shareholder shows better management 
performance than that of professional management, the increase in stock ownership of the largest shareholder is interpreted as a result of 
avoiding decision-making delays due to a more responsible management. This is also attributed to the existence of multiple stakeholders. 
Making prompt decisions and responsible management is due to the reduction of costs associated with conflicts. According to model 2, 
which used dummy variables according to ownership ratio, the highest performance is for 50%–80%, where ownership can be maintained 
while being held in check by other shareholders, rather than the case where shares were overly concentrated to the largest shareholder. 
According to the analysis results on firm sustainability as an independent variable, the difference in ownership structure does not affect 
the sustainability of savings banks when the ownership is divided into corporate and private. However, when management participation is 
divided into the professional and direct management, the estimated coefficient for management participation was -1.34 in model 3. This 
means that professional management, compared to direct management, shortens the life span of mutual savings banks. Additionally, the 
increase in corporate profits, rise in BIS ratio, decrease in nonperforming loans, and size of the savings bank appears to increase the 
sustainability of mutual savings banks, which is consistent with the general interpretation. 
 
Table 6.  Effect of ownership structure and history on performance 
 ROA HIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
intercept  
-12.4630 
(1.9354)*** 
-12.1306*** 
(1.9247) 
22.2362***  
(2.1507)  
21.6807***    
(2.1463) 
own   -0.7611 (0.2425)*** 
-0.7090*** 
(0.2391) 
-0.1580  
(0.1675) 
-0.1453   
(0.1645) 
sur 
0.0219  
(0.0101)* 
0.01911* 
(0.01028) 
0.0385**  
(0.0156) 
0.0369**    
(0.0156) 
bis  
0.0236 
(0.0041)*** 
0.02323*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0027)  
0.0159***    
(0.0027) 
npl  
-0.2154 
(0.0099)*** 
-0.2156*** 
(0.0099) 
0.0291***  
(0.0070)  
0.0283***    
(0.0070) 
exp  
-0.0410  
(0.0935) 
-0.0313 
(0.0934) 
0.0542  
(0.0561)  
0.0593    
(0.0560) 
commercial  
0.138 
(0.0469)*** 
0.1426*** 
(0.0467) 
0.0053  
(0.0266)  
0.0079  
(0.0265) 
manager 
-1.4747 
(0.3330)*** 
-1.4047*** 
(0.3357) 
-1.3469***  
(0.5180)  
-1.2924*    
(0.5173) 
lasset  
1.0894 
(0.1427)*** 
1.0770*** 
(0.1439) 
0.9455***  
(0.1386) 
0.9631***    
(0.1387) 
por 
0.0079  
(0.0046)* 
 
-0.0097***  
(0.0037) 
 
por80   
0.4049 
(0.2859) 
 
-0.7589***     
(0.2044) 
por50    
0.8311** 
 (0.2620) 
 
-0.1813    
(0.1914) 
gdp  
0.0397  
(0.0435) 
0.0425 
(0.0433) 
-0.0013  
(0.0245)  
-.0005    
(0.0245) 
sample 1448 1448 1448 1448 
R2 0.3492 0.3457 0.0217 0.0241 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.9, No.8, 2018 
 
204 
 
Finally, the logit model was used to examine whether the independent variables in the above model affect management 
form and ownership structure. The largest shareholder’s participation in management was not affected by almost all 
variables, other than savings bank size. This suggests the decision of the largest shareholder to participate in management is 
determined regardless of the performance of the savings bank. Therefore, even if the savings bank becomes difficult to 
manage, the largest shareholder does not participate in direct management. Ownership type has a positive effect on the 
management participation of the largest shareholder, because a professional CEO is assumed to be hired in the case of 
corporation ownership, rather than assigning a CEO related to the parent company. Moreover, if profitability is low and 
period of existence brief, the savings bank is more likely to be owned by a corporation. This is because most insolvent 
mutual savings banks were taken over by banks and other corporations when they became subject to bankruptcy. If the 
ownership structure is concentrated, many banks are owned by corporations, since most corporations that newly acquired 
mutual savings banks own 100% of shares, which is in line with the above explanations. 
 
Table 7. Effect of ownership structure and history on performance 
 Manager Ownership 
intercept 
-51.2581 
(9.3740) 
-66.7156 
(9.2852) 
-6.7563 
(4.7365) 
-4.6516 
(4.6295) 
ownership 
(manager) 
1.0997 
(1.0490) 
0.8165 
(1.0933) 
 3.1348*** 
(0.8502) 
3.6779*** 
(0.8844) 
sur 
-0.0184 
(0.4428) 
-0.0781 
(0.0518) 
-0.0974** 
(0.0380) 
-0.0962*** 
(0.0364) 
roa 
-0.0987 
(0.0818) 
-0.1818 
(0.0923) 
-0.0847* 
(0.0433)   
-0.0639 
(0.0421) 
bis 
0.0406 
(0.0315) 
0.0207 
(0.0260) 
0.0264* 
(0.0139) 
0.0208 
(0.0138) 
npl 
0.0312 
(0.0407) 
0.01234 
(0.0432) 
-0.0106 
(0.0198)  
-0.0060 
(0.0196) 
exp 
0.3166 
(0.5761) 
0.9066 
(0.4668) 
0.2901* 
 (0.1666)  
0.2610* 
(0.1579) 
commercial1 
0.0243 
(0.2408) 
-0.2882 
(0.3042) 
0.0372 
 (0.0791) 
0.0086 
(0.0782) 
lasset 
3.2133*** 
(0.6614) 
5.1599*** 
(0.6583) 
0.3829 
 (0.3510)  
0.4189 
(0.3462) 
por 
0.0801*** 
(0.0194) 
 
0.0634***  
(0.0090) 
 
por80  
8.5204*** 
(1.7276) 
 
3.1869*** 
(0.5182) 
gdp 
-0.0242 
(0.2159) 
-.2159 
(0.2666) 
0.0358 
(0.0725) 
0.0123 
(0.0720) 
Log likelihood -101.4778   -92.1957 -325.7207  -335.0582 
 
 4. Conclusions 
Although mutual savings banks in Korea have a short history, a large number of mutual savings banks have been 
liquidated as a result of the foreign exchange and global financial crises. Therefore, this study examines how the 
management performance and sustainability of savings banks are influenced by the ownership and governance structures, 
which were the causes of restructuring of mutual savings banks, and analyzes ownership and governance structure 
determinants. 
First, for performance, corporate-owned mutual savings banks managed by professional CEOs seem to have a negative 
relationship with performance. That is, corporate-owned mutual savings banks managed by professional CEOs have 
relatively low performance compared to mutual savings banks in which the largest shareholders are individuals that 
participate in direct management. Second, for firm sustainability as an independent variable, the difference in ownership 
structure does not affect the sustainability of savings banks when ownership is divided into corporate and private. Finally, 
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according to the results of the logit model on whether the independent variables affect the management form and ownership 
structure, the largest shareholder’s participation in management was not affected by almost all variables, except for bank 
size. Moreover, ownership type had a positive effect on the management participation of the largest shareholder because 
most of the insolvent mutual savings banks were taken over by banks and other corporations when they became bankrupt. If 
ownership is concentrated, several of the banks are owned by corporations, and most corporations that newly acquired 
mutual savings banks own 100% of shares, which is in line with the above explanation. 
Meanwhile, for management performance according to the largest shareholder type, private and privately-owned mutual 
savings banks performed better than corporate-owned ones. Considering the relationship between the degree of management 
participation of the largest shareholder and management performance, the mutual savings banks where the largest 
shareholders participate in management directly or indirectly perform relatively better than those managed by professional 
CEOs. In other words, mutual savings banks have shown the highest level of management performance when the largest 
shareholder is an individual that participates directly in management. Therefore, to improve the management soundness and 
profitability of mutual savings banks and establish them as sound consumer-based financial institutions the following 
considerations should be paid attention to. While owner management should be promoted, stock ownership should be 
properly decentralized to prevent the loss of checks from the market and outside parties by concentrating over 80% of the 
shares to the owner. Alternatively, the supervisory authority should strengthen regulation and supervision to provide 
institutional strategies to prevent moral hazard due to owners. 
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Note 1. In Korea, there is no restriction on stock ownership by industrial capital for financial institutions other 
than banks. However, for banks, the stock ownership by industrial capital is limited to 4% of the total number of 
stocks issued in accordance with Article 16-2 of the Banking Act. 
Note 2. Savings banks originally settled their fiscal year in June. As of 2015, the settlement month was adjusted 
to December. 
Note 3. In fact, indirect management can be considered similar to direct management, since the largest 
shareholder controls the manager with management rights. 
 
